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ETHNICITY AND VIOLENCE DURING
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: EVIDENCE
FROM SOUTH AFRICA
Francesco Amodio
McGill University
Giorgio Chiovelli
London Business School
Abstract
This paper shows that ethnic diversity within the disenfranchised majority is a strong correlate of
the incidence of violence during democratization. We study the relationship between ethnicity and
conict in South Africa during the fall of apartheid. Migration ows following the implementation
and repeal of apartheid segregation laws induce cross-sectional and time variation in the ethnic
composition of districts. Using Census data from the years before and after democratization,
we compare the evolution of conict across districts experiencing differential changes in ethnic
composition. We nd that ethnic polarization and inequality within the black majority correlate
strongly and positively with the incidence of armed confrontations between black-dominated
groups. Results suggest that during democratic transitions ethnic markers can become a salient
technology to separate individuals into well-identied groups and mobilize them for political
violence. (JEL: D74, J15, N47, N97, O15, P48, R23)
1. Introduction
Transitions to democracy are often violent. Conict plagued almost half of all
democratic transitions that occurred between 1973 and 2000 (Karatnycky 2005).
Existing studies of democratization conceptualize violence as manifestation of the
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struggle for power between a small ruling elite and a large disenfranchised majority,
regarding the latter as a unitary, homogeneous group (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
This paper investigates the role of divisions within the disenfranchised majority.
Once the transition begins, disenfranchised groups struggle among themselves to
achieve dominance. The ability of political parties to mobilize individuals for violence
determines the extent to which political confrontations escalate into violent conict.
Ethnic markers have the potential to separate individuals into well-identied groups.
In their struggle for power, political parties can use ethnicity as a tool to mobilize
individuals for violence. We therefore hypothesize that, as democratization unfolds,
societies that are more ethnically diverse are more prone to experience conict.
We test this hypothesis in the context of South Africa through the end of the apartheid
regime. There are several reasons why South Africa represents an ideal setting to
explore the relationship between ethnicity and conict during democratization. First,
it is a newly established democracy, with the rst democratic elections held in 1994.
Second, democratization was violent. The vast majority of armed confrontations
involved black-dominated parties and unions that struggled among themselves to
benet from the transition and dominate the new institutional scenario. Moreover,
violence was not evenly distributed within the country. Third, above and beyond the
separation between the white elite and the black majority, the newly enfranchised
black population was highly heterogeneous along ethnic lines, which allows us to
explore this specic dimension. Fourth, the implementation and repeal of apartheid
segregation laws induced cross-sectional and time variation in ethnic composition of
districts. We can therefore study the relationship between ethnic diversity and conict
before, during, and after democratization, analyzing changes over time. This rules
out the possibility that time-invariant unobserved characteristics at the district level -
such as geographical characteristics - determine both ethnic composition and conict
incidence, generating a spurious correlation between the two.
Our analysis shows that the changes in ethnic composition that occurred in the
democratization period correlate signicantly with the evolution of conict incidence
at the local level. As the apartheid-era restrictions on internal mobility were lifted,
2.5 million blacks moved out of segregated districts and relocated in others.1 We
show that a strong relationship exists between the resulting changes in ethnic
composition of districts and the pattern of political violence in the period. In
particular, ethnolinguistic polarization within the blacks at the district level is
positively correlated with the number of armed confrontations between black-
dominated organized groups. This result holds across several regression model
specications and identication strategies. First, it is robust to the inclusion of controls
1. Source: 1996 Population Census of South Africa (Statistics South Africa 1998). This is the estimated
number of individuals who moved from one magisterial district to another between 1991 and 1996 (see
Section 3). This corresponds to a district-level outow rate of 8.66%. Reed (2013) reports very similar
estimates using data from the South Africa Migration and Health Survey (SAMHS).
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capturing the demographic and economic characteristics of districts. Importantly, the
extent of immigration per se has no systematic relationship with conict incidence,
but rather matters only when it changes the local ethnic distribution. Second, the
relationship between changes in ethnic diversity and conict still holds within clusters
of neighboring districts. This undermines the concern that unobserved characteristics
at a ner geographical level may account for the result. Third, we dig deeper in the
history of South Africa to implement an identication strategy based on instrumental
variables. We recover information on the ethnic distribution of districts before the full
implementation of segregation laws, and use it to predict the change in polarization
that occurred in the democratization period. The extent of historical return migration
determines the strength of our instrument and its scope for identication. Results still
support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and conict
during democratization.
Several pieces of quantitative and qualitative evidence support the hypothesis that,
during the democratic transition, ethnicity became a salient trait for the separation
of individuals in society. First, the measure of ethnic diversity that predicts conict
is the polarization index. In their theory of ethnic conict, Esteban and Ray (2011b)
identify the polarization index as capturing the degree of publicness of the disputed
prize. This is consistent with our conceptualization of the struggle within the black
majority in South Africa during democratization as a dispute for political power,
a prize whose nature is intrinsically public. Second, the narratives from the period
reveal how ethnicity suddenly became salient for the political struggle at the onset of
the democratic transition, while it was not in the period before or after. Third, ethnic
diversity maps into diverse support for black political parties. Using electoral data
from the rst democratic elections, we show that a positive correlation exists between
ethnolinguistic polarization within the black majority and political polarization across
major black political parties.
Our interpretation of results rest on the assumption that incentives to achieve political
power were highest during democratization, also at the local level. This is the period
when political parties negotiated the new form of government, and local institutions
were held responsible for the implementation of key policies that were to shape the
future of South Africa. We therefore expect the salience of ethnicity as a separation
and mobilization technology to be higher in those districts where achieving control
over policy implementation is more valuable. To test this hypothesis, we focus on
the issue of land reform and redistribution. We augment the main conict regression
specication with the interaction between within-black ethnolinguistic polarization
and a district-level measure of agricultural suitability. We nd that the estimated
coefcient of the interaction term is positive and signicant. This indicates that the
salience of ethnic diversity for conict is higher in those districts where land is more
suitable for agriculture, and incentives to achieve control over its redistribution are
higher.
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Above and beyond ethnic composition, we also investigate the role of ethnic
inequality. Conditional on the relative size of groups, income differences shape
the incentives to mobilize and be mobilized for political violence. Building on
Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016), we develop an index that captures
heterogeneity in the fraction of top earners across ethnic groups. Conditionally on
the level of within-black ethnolinguistic polarization, we nd that ethnic inequality
at the district level correlates positively with the local incidence of conict during
democratization.2 Moreover, the estimated coefcient of the interaction between
ethnic polarization and inequality is negative and signicant. We interpret this as
suggestive evidence that income inequality across groups matters positively for
conict incidence, and more so when groups are unequal in both income and relative
size. For instance, conict incidence is high when a large poor majority faces a small
rich minority.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst paper to investigate the salience of
ethnic diversity in explaining the incidence of violence during democratic transitions.
We bring together and thus contribute to several strands of the literature. First,
we contribute to the empirical literature on democratization. Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2008) and Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson (2016) show that
democracy has a signicant and robust positive effect on per capita GDP growth and
levels respectively. But, violent transitions to democracy correlate with subsequent
lower growth, lower degree of civil liberties, and higher incidence of civil conict
(Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde 2012, 2014; Sunde and Cervellati 2014; Cervellati
and Sunde 2014). We contribute to this debate by showing that ethnic diversity and
inequality within the disenfranchised are two strong correlates of violence during
democratization. Our analysis suggests that, apart from the struggle between the
ruling elite and the majority, the study of violence within the latter and its determinants
can contribute to our understanding of why some democratic transitions are violent
and others are not.
We also contribute to the literature on ethnic conict. Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999)
argue that polarized societies - comprising internally homogeneous but externally
very distant groups - are more prone to experience conict. Ethnic lines become
salient as they allow for separation of individuals into groups that are homogenous
under one trait (ethnicity), but signicantly different along other dimensions (Esteban
and Ray 2008, 2011a). Caselli and Coleman (2013) conceptualize ethnicity as a
technological device that prevents indiscriminate access to the expected gains of
the winning group. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) provide the rst empirical
evidence showing that ethnic polarization correlates with the probability of conict
outbreak and incidence. Finally, Esteban and Ray (2011b) develop an extensive theory
of conict that highlights the role of different ethnic distribution measures. The
2. Using a rainfall-based measure of inequality between ethnic groups at the country level, Guariso and
Rogall (2017) show that higher ethnic inequality is positively correlated with the incidence of ethnic civil
conict.
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empirical evidence in Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) supports their theoretical
arguments. More generally, this paper builds upon a growing body of the literature
that studies conict and violence at a disaggregated level.3
Our contribution to the literature on ethnic conict is twofold. First, the evidence in
this paper suggests that the prospect of regime change can be a mediating factor in the
relationship between ethnic diversity and conict: the salience of ethnicity for conict
can change with the incentives to achieve political power and mobilize individuals for
violence. This is consistent with a strand of literature in political science that shows
how ethnic traits are redened and mobilized accordingly depending on the incentives
of the relevant actors in society, and the institutional framework in which they operate
(Posner 2005; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).
Second, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst paper that exploits variation
over time in the ethnic composition of districts and investigate its relationship with
the evolution of conict through time.4 Our analysis in rst differences exploits the
variation in ethnic distribution originated by the internal migration of South Africans,
allowing us to control for all time-invariant characteristics at the district level that
could confound the relationship between ethnic diversity and conict. Our results
show that this relationship holds true in differences and thus is not attributable to
such confounders.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short overview of the
history of contemporary South Africa. Section 3 introduces the data and measures we
use, together with preliminary evidence. The main empirical results are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. South Africa and the Democratic Transition
The history of South Africa’s democratic transition traces back to the apartheid
regime. Apartheid - meaning apartness in Afrikaans - was a form of government based
on physical separation of blacks and whites achieved through racial discrimination
and political disenfranchisement of the black majority. The apartheid legislation
identied four different races living in the South Africa: black, white, indian, and
3. See for example Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013), Dube and Vargas (2013), Besley and Reynal-
Querol (2014), Harari and La Ferrara (2016), Berman et al. (2017), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2016), Bazzi and Gudgeon (2016).
4. Existing studies of ethnic conict make use of time-invariant ethnic distribution indices, drawn from
historical and encyclopedic sources (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 2010; Desmet, Ortuño Ortín,
and Wacziarg 2012). One exception is Novta (2016), who uses Census data from Bosnia to derive ethnic
distribution measures at the municipality level. She studies the relationship between the latter and the
spread of civil conict, but considers the ethnic distribution of municipalities in 1991 only and does not
investigate changes over time.
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colored. The black population was further classied into native ethnicities. The long-
term goal of apartheid was the complete separation between a white Republic of South
Africa and a number of independent black states, one for each black ethnolinguistic
group. In order to achieve this goal, the Bantu Authorities Act (1951) and Bantu
Resettlement Act (1954) established ten black ethnicity-based homeland reserve areas
known as Bantustans.5 In less than thirty years, 3.5 million blacks were forced
to relocate to the homelands, and the government enforced strict control over the
mobility of blacks within the country (Clark and Worger 2011). By mid 1980s, the
apartheid system began to collapse. This was mainly due to the internal contradictions
and conicting effects of its policies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). With the UN
embargoes in the late 1980s, black opposition parties started to foresee the possibility
of a regime change.
At the eve of the democratic transition, several black parties vied for power. The
African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, was the historical black party.
Until the state banned it in 1950s, the ANC represented almost all the black
population. Later on, the exile of ANC leaders and the party alignment with the
socialist cause created the space for new political representation on the ground.
The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) formed in 1953, and the United Democratic
Front (UDF) arose in 1983. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a former member of ANC and
member of the Zulu royal family, founded the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in
1975. Until the 1979 London Congress, opposition to apartheid was fairly cohesive.
With the beginning of the end of the apartheid regime and the rising prospects
of democratization, the alliance broke up and confrontations started among black-
dominated groups. The struggles between the IFP and both the ANC and UDF were
the most violent. The IFP drew support from the traditional Zulu chiey structures,
and ran on a strongly conservative political platform closely aligned with large
business interests in the KwaZulu region (Carver 1996). Most urban youth and
working class supported instead the ANC or UDF, drawn by their vision of a non-
racial unitary state in contrast with traditional chief power.
In the late 1980s, the white government decided to repeal several apartheid laws. The
turning point for the democratization process was the unbanning of the ANC and the
liberation of its leaders in 1990. Between 1990 and 1991, the government restored free
mobility of blacks within South Africa. In the meanwhile, representatives of all major
political parties took part in several rounds of negotiations over the new constitutional
framework. While the ANC strongly supported the creation of a centralized state,
5. Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows the map of Bantustans in South Africa as dened by the apartheid
legislation as of 1986. These were: Transkei and Ciskei (Xhosa ethnicity), Bophuthatswana (Tswana),
Venda (Venda), Gazankulu (Tsonga), Lebowa (Sotho), Qwaqwa (Sotho), KwaZulu (Zulu), KaNgwane
(Swazi) and KwaNdebele (Sotho). Over time, the government granted various degrees of self-government
to the Bantustans, ranging from independent state-nation - as in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and
Ciskei between 1977 and 1981 - to limited self-government - as in KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu,
Qwaqwa, KaNgwane and KwaNdebele.
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both the ruling white National Party and the IFP favored a decentralized form of
government. From 1990 to 1993, several meetings trying to reach an agreement
failed. An interim constitution setting electoral rules was approved in November
1993. In December 1993, the IFP announced that it would not take part in the
elections because of omissions from the interim constitution including the absence
of a clear acknowledgement of the role of traditional leaders and the Zulu king.
Conict between the ANC and the IFP reached its climax. Deadly violence ensued
in Creighton, KwaMashu, and Ndwedwe as the IFP substituted violence for voting
against the ANC. The IFP decided to enter the election just seven days before the vote
in April 1994.
The 1993 constitutional arrangements held South African provinces responsible
for such crucial matters as agriculture, roads and transportation, and welfare.
Decentralization made the Magisterial District a key seat of power.6 Transitional
Rural Councils were established at the Magisterial District level and held responsible
for the allocation of land.7 This deepened the confrontations between the ANC, which
favored land reform, and the IFP, which favored preserving the power of traditional
chief leaders to allocate land.
The process of democratic transition and decentralization raised the incentives for
black political parties to achieve control of local level institutions. Ethnicity was
a readily available technology to separate individuals into well-identied groups
(Esteban and Ray 2008, 2011a; Caselli and Coleman 2013). Ethnic lines suddenly
became salient for the expression of political tensions. Anecdotal evidence shows
how the perception of ethnicities changed in the transition scenario:
“Who are you?" “We are Zulus," they reply. “What are you doing here? Where are all
the other people?" “They ran away. They were Xhosa and Shangaans [Tsonga]. We
live here now, so there is no trouble." “What trouble?" “This thing about Inkatha and
ANC. For years we lived here. We were Zulus and Shangaans and Xhosa all mixed
up but now we are fighting and I don’t know why". (Sunday Tribune, April 1992)
6. The Magisterial District is a sub-provincial territorial unit dened by the judicial system under
the administration of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. The 1994 elections
structured the voting districts around these Magisterial Districts.
7. The Transitional Rural Council (TRP) and the Transitional Representative Council (TRPC) were the
provisional local municipalities from 1994 to 2000. The implementation of the 2000 municipal system
substituted both TRPC and TRP with the actual local municipalities.
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3. Data
3.1. Sources and Measurement
Our database combines several different data sources. The geographical unit of
analysis is the Magisterial District (MD). Figure A.2 in Appendix A shows a map
of South Africa with the district boundaries. Pre-1994 demarcations still inform
these boundaries. This makes the MDs particularly valuable as units of comparative
analysis on a small-scale geographical basis, as all other administrative boundaries
have been re-demarcated numerous times in the 1990s (Case and Deaton 1999;
Hoffman and Todd 2000). We exclude those MDs that the 1991 Census of the
Republic of South Africa did not cover as they belonged to independent Bantustans.
Our nal sample consists of the 294 districts for which information is available in
both the 1991 and 1996 Census.
Part of our empirical analysis also covers the democratic period, focusing on the years
2001 through 2011. The 2011 Census data do not report the MD of residence of
interviewed households. Therefore, we use the Local Municipality (LM) as alternative
unit of analysis. LMs became the ofcial most local tier of government after 2000,
substituting the Transitional Councils that were previously established at the MD
level. Their boundaries stayed reasonably constant thereafter.
Ethnicity. We derive information on the ethnic composition of districts and its
changes using South Africa Census data (Statistics South Africa 2011, 1991, 1998,
2004, 2014). We identify individuals belonging to different ethnolinguistic groups
according to the rst language they speak. The African native groups in the database
are Swazi, Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda.8 For each district and
Census year, we count the total number of individuals in each group and compute
the relative share of each group within the black majority. We then use these within-
black shares to compute the relevant measures of ethnic distribution. We rst follow
Esteban and Ray (2011b) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012), and focus on three
different distributional indexes of ethnic diversity: the polarization index P , the
8. Desmet, Ortuño Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) show how to use the genealogical relationships between
world languages in the construction of distribution indexes. In line with their approach, we use the
information contained in the Ethnologue linguistic database (Lewis 2009), assuming that all languages
at the same level are equally distant from the proto-languages of their respective families. We build our
measure considering black ethnolinguistic groups in South Africa that correspond to level 11 in the world
language tree and reported in Figure C.1 in the Online Appendix. The Ethnologue database has been used
as source of ethnolinguistic information also by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg
(2003), Desmet, Ortuño Ortín, and Weber (2009), and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012).
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 21, 2017 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Amodio and Chiovelli Ethnicity and Violence During Democratic Transitions 9
fractionalization index F , and Greenberg-Gini index G. They are dened as
P D
mX
iD1
mX
jD1
n2i njdij F D
mX
iD1
ni .1  ni / G D
mX
iD1
mX
jD1
ninjdij
where ni is the population share of ethnolinguistic group i and m is the overall
number of groups, while dij is a measure of distances between groups.9 Esteban and
Ray (2011b) show the relationship between the equilibrium intensity of conict and
these three distribution measures. In particular, their theory posits that the degree of
publicness of the disputed prize determines the relative salience of P as opposed to
F in explaining conict incidence.
We also employ the binary version of the polarization index as implemented in
Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 2010), which falls
within the class of polarization measures proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994). This
is computed as
RQ D 1 
mX
iD1

1=2  ni
1=2
2
ni D 4 
mX
iD1
n2i .1  ni /
The difference between theRQ and the P index is that the former considers all inter-
group distances dij to be binary. It thus returns a distribution measure linked to the
generation of social tension between equally distant groups. It is worth noticing that,
when groups have different sizes, changes in the population size of a given group
do not map systematically into changes in the polarization index. Esteban and Ray
(1994) provide a series of examples illustrating this point.
Finally, we refer to Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016) in building a
measure of ethnic inequality. This is a Gini index that captures the extent to which
ethnic groups differ in their relative income. We derive it by focusing on the fraction of
top earners in each ethnic group, as derived from Census data. Let yh be the fraction of
individuals in ethnolinguistic group h that belongs to the top 10% of the overall black
income distribution. Let the group identier hD 1 tom be indexed in non-decreasing
order (yh  yhC1). The ethnic inequality index EI is computed as
EI D 1
m

mC 1  2
Pm
hD1.mC 1  h/yhPm
hD1 yh

Unlike the polarization index, the value of theEI index is independent of the relative
size of each group.
9. For a detailed discussion of these indexes please refer to Esteban and Ray (2011b). In the computation
ofP , we follow Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) and use dij D 0:05. Results are robust to the choice
of dij .
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Conflict. We measure conict incidence using the Geo-referenced Event Dataset
of the Uppsala Conict Data Program (UCDP-GED v1.5).10 Assembled by the
Department of Peace and Conict Research at Uppsala University, it provides geo-
referenced information on organized violence in Africa between 1989 and 2010,
detailing different categories - state-based conict, non-state conict, and one-sided
violence.11 For each conict event, the data provide information on the date, place
of the event (with coordinates), actors participating, and estimates of fatalities.12
We measure the yearly incidence of armed confrontations between black-dominated
organized groups in South Africa at the district level by counting the number of related
geo-referenced conict events in each district per year. These clashes all belong to the
category of non-state conict.13
The UCDP-GED dataset records very few non-state conict events in South Africa
after 2000, and none of them in 2001 and 2011. We thus measure conict incidence
in these years using the Armed Conict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
database (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen 2010). The dataset covers the period
from 1997 onwards. It reports detailed geo-referenced information on all reported
political violence events in over 60 developing countries in Africa and Asia. It records
also episodes of political violence that take place outside the context of a civil war,
such as violence against civilians, militia interactions, communal conict, and rioting.
It draws information on each event from a variety of sources, including reports
from developing countries and local media, humanitarian agencies, and research
publications. Although the nature of events can differ from UCDP-GED, ACLED
data bring about substantial variation in conict incidence between the years 2001
and 2011.14
10. Department of Peace and Conict Research, Uppsala University. The dataset is available at
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/ged/data.php. See Melander and Sundberg (2011) for the latest data presentation.
11. State-based conict is dened as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year in the period (1989-2010). Non-state conict
refers to the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government
of a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year in the period. One-sided violence refers
to the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians
that results in at least 25 deaths in a year in the period (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010).
12. In the study of the relationship between ethnic polarization and conict, the literature has used
conict data from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 2010;
Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012). This is mainly due to the cross-countries analysis and large time span
(1945 to 2010) these studies usually consider. Non-state and One-sided conicts are there used to test the
robustness of results.
13. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the total number of One-sided and Non-state conict events per
year that can be mapped into magisterial districts, together with the estimated total number of deaths.
One-sided conict events refer to violence perpetrated by organized groups (including the Government
of South Africa or the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) white supremacist movement) against
civilians.
14. Please refer to Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd (2014) for further information. See also Eck (2012) for a
complete discussion of the UCDP-GED database and its comparison with the ACLED database.
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Political Parties. In order to provide direct evidence of the link between
ethnolinguistic diversity and political mobilization, we use data on election results
from the 1994 South Africa general elections (Alvarez-Rivera 2004). The data are
disaggregated at the district level. Out of the 298 MDs surveyed in the 1991 Census,
we are able to map 270 of them into 1994 electoral districts. Given our interest in
political mobilization within the black majority, we focus on black-dominated parties.
We consider those parties that conquered at least one seat in the National Assembly.
These are the ANC, IFP, PAC, and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP).
Knowing the number of votes for each party, we can derive a measure of within-black
political polarization at the district level using the binary version of the polarization
index explained before.
Socio-economic and Geographical Controls. Using Census data, we derive a
number of additional socio-economic variables by aggregating information at the
district level. We use data on population, rural population, number of individuals
reporting no education, number of unemployed individuals, number of individuals
out of the labor force, and number of South African citizens.15 In addition to Census,
conict, and election data, we rely on several other sources to derive other variables
such as night-time lights as proxy for local economic conditions, terrain ruggedness
and slope, accessibility as proxied by travel time to the nearest big city, and local
suitability for agriculture. We discuss the sources of these data in Appendix B.
3.2. Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 shows the total population sizes of each population group in our sample
according to the 1991 and 1996 Census, and their difference over time. It does
so for the seven black ethnolinguistic groups, and for the main population groups
as dened in the Census: whites, blacks, asians, and colored.16 The table shows
evidence of a substantial inow of individuals belonging to those black groups that
were previously segregated in independent Bantustans. At the extreme, the Tswana
group population increases by more than 30%. On top of migration inows from
independent Bantustans, we nd evidence of substantial internal mobility. According
to 1996 Census data, 2.5 million blacks moved from one district to another between
1991 and 1996. Figure A.3 in Appendix A shows the change in the population share
of the three biggest ethnolinguistic groups at the district level between 1991 and 1996
plotted against the share of black population in 1991. It is worth noticing that the most
15. In our regression specication we use the logarithm of these variables, augmenting all values by
0.01. Results go through other variable specications and level shifts.
16. Our study sample excludes those districts that were part of independent Bantustans in 1991. Table
A.3 in Appendix A shows the same totals, but calculated over all districts in the 1991 and 1996 Census.
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of former independent Bantustan territories in the 1996 Census brings
about a dramatic increase in the population stocks of the corresponding ethnolinguistic groups.
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Table 1. Group population sizes.
Total Population Difference
1991 Census 1996 Census 1991–1996
Xhosa 2,493,382 2,570,752 77,370
Zulu 8,416,125 8,579,680 163,555
Sotho 6,414,684 6,648,697 234,038
Swazi 943,989 989,354 45,365
Tswana 1,437,660 1,900,704 463,044
Tsonga 1,450,874 1,533,665 82,791
Venda 116,533 118,829 2,296
Black 21,642,682 22,697,442 1,054,760
White 5,065,193 4,398,995 -666,198
Asian 985,317 1,038,281 52,964
Colored 3,259,250 3,313,530 54,280
Notes: The table reports the group population sizes in South Africa in 1991 and 1996, together with their
difference. Totals are computed over all those districts for which information is available in both the 1991 and
1996 Census, and are thus part of our study sample (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
relevant changes do not seem to be concentrated in those districts where the overall
share of blacks in 1991 was either negligible or close to one.17
Heterogeneity in black group population sizes and their changes map into variation
in within-black ethnic distribution measures. Figure A.5 in Appendix A shows the
changes in the distribution of within-black polarization P and fractionalization F
over time across districts. According to the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
of equality of distributions, and for both measures, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the 1991 and 1996 distributions are equal. Indeed, Table A.2 in Appendix A
shows that both the averages and standard deviations of bothP andF are very similar
across the two years. Nonetheless, evidence shows meaningful variation in the two
measures within districts. Figure 1 plots the 1996 values of within-black polarization
and fractionalization measures in each district against their corresponding values
in 1991. Those points located away from the 45-degree line are districts where the
ethnic composition changed between 1991 and 1996. The time difference is as large
17. See also Figure A.4 in Appendix A for further analysis of migration patterns in the period.
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Figure 1. Ethnic diversity over time. The gures plot the levels of within-black ethnolinguistic
polarization P and fractionalization F in 1996 against their value in the same district in 1991. The
farther points are from the 45 degree line, the larger the change in ethnic composition over time
(Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
as 0.6 for some districts. The standard deviation of changes over time is as high as
half of the 1991 cross sectional standard deviation of both measures. Moreover, the
values of polarization and fractionalization in 1991 explain no more than 10% of
the variation in their corresponding changes between 1991 and 1996, so that there
is enough independent variation between levels and changes in the two. In the same
period, average ethnic inequality decreases by 30%, but also in this case the change
is highly heterogeneous, with the index dropping by more than 0.7 in some districts
while rising by 0.59 in others.
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1 to 5 Conflict Events 6 to 10
11 to 20 21 to 30
31 or more
Fraction of Districts With
Figure 2. Distribution of conict over time. The gure shows the evolution of the distribution of
the total number of Non-state conict events across districts in South Africa as recorded in the
geo-referenced Event Dataset of the Uppsala Conict Data Program - UCDP-GED v1.5.
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In the period 1989-1996, we count more than 2,000 armed confrontations between
black-dominated organized groups. Approximately 85% involved the ANC in conict
with the IFP. The remaining 15% involved the UDF opposing the IFP or the ANC
Greens faction conicting with the ANC Reds faction. Table A.2 in Appendix A
shows that the average number of conict events per district is 1.2 in 1991, with
large cross-district variation. The same average is 0.1 in 1996, but with a cross-
district variation of 0.7. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of
distributions lead us to reject the hypothesis that the 1991 and 1996 distributions
are equal. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the distribution of the number of these
conict events across districts in South Africa from 1989 to 1999. The fraction of
districts in which at least one event occurred increases from 1989 onwards, reaching
a height in 1993. In the year prior to the rst democratic elections, 50 different districts
experienced at least one conict event. Conict prevalence decreases thereafter, but
some districts still experience as many as 10 conict events in 1996. Overall, from
1989 to 1999, the data record at least one conict in 72 different districts. Conict
prevalence is highest in Kwa-Zulu Natal and Gauteng. These are the provinces with
the highest within-black share of Zulus, and thus support to the IFP.
3.2.1. Basic Correlations. Table A.4 in Appendix A reports the correlation structure
between the main variables of interest in 1991 and 1996 in levels (Panel A and B)
and changes (Panel C). The table shows the estimated linear correlation coefcients
with p-values in parenthesis. Within-black polarization P and fractionalization F are
highly positively correlated in both levels and changes. However, there is residual
variation to exploit. For example, in 1991, the magisterial districts of Reddersburg,
Barkly-East, Westonaria, and Oberholzer all have values of P between 0.35 and 0.4.
However, the values of F in the same districts ranges from 0.28 to 0.8. The same
holds for the ethnic inequality measureEI . The correlation with P and F is negative
and signicant in levels. Nonetheless, while for example the districts of Virginia,
Jacobsdal, and Clanwilliam all have values of P between 0.5 and 0.55, their EI
values range from 0.07 to 0.77. Notice also that the correlation between changes in
EI and changes in P and F is close to zero and insignicant.18
The correlation between conict and ethnic distribution and inequality measures
is close to zero and insignicant in both 1991 and 1996. On the contrary, we
estimate a positive and signicant correlation in 1991 between conict and observable
characteristics at the district level such as the size of the black population, overall
population size, and economic development as measured by night-time lights.
Consistent with Michalopoulos (2012), Table A.4 in Appendix A shows that
agricultural suitability is negatively and signicantly correlated with ethnic diversity,
but positively and signicantly correlated with conict incidence. This is an example
18. Table C.1 in the Online Appendix shows the correlation between P , F , EI , and conict across
periods.
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of how time-invariant characteristics at the district level may confound the estimated
relationship in levels between ethnic diversity and conict. When looking at changes
over time, we nd a very different pattern. The correlation between conict and ethnic
distribution and inequality measures becomes positive and highly signicant. For
example, the districts of Richmond and Port Shepstone (both in Kwa-Zulu Natal)
are among the 10 districts that experienced the biggest decrease in within-black
polarization, and are also among the 10 districts that experienced the biggest drop in
conict incidence. Similarly, the district of Mooi River, one of those with the highest
decrease in conict incidence, also experienced one of the biggest declines in ethnic
inequality. In what follows, we adopt a regression framework to analyze these patterns
of correlation in a more systematic way.
4. Regression Analysis
4.1. Cross-sectional Estimates
We start by examining cross-sectional patterns and investigate the link between ethnic
distribution and conict separately for the years 1991 and 1996. We follow Esteban,
Mayoral, and Ray (2012) and adopt the following regression specication
conf ipt D p C ˇ Pipt C  Fipt C ı G=N ipt C Z0ip! CX0ipt' C uipt (1)
where conf ipt is the number of non-state conict events recorded in district i in
province p in year t . Pipt , Fipt andG=Nipt are the within-black distribution indexes
in the same district and year, with N being the size of the black population in
thousands. Zip is a set of time-invariant geographical characteristics (ruggedness,
slope index, accessibility, agricultural suitability). Xipt is the vector of time-varying
demographic and economic controls. p captures province xed effects, netting out
average differences across provinces. The residual uipt captures those remaining
unobserved factors that affect conict incidence.
Panel A and B of Table 2 show the corresponding set of cross-sectional estimates
for the three distribution indexes. Columns (1) and (2) report ordinary least squares
estimates. Columns (3) and (4) report negative binomial estimates, which suit the
count nature of the dependent variable better. To analyze also the extensive margin of
conict, in columns (5) and (6) we replace as dependent variable a dummy equal to
one if the database records at least one conict event in the district in the year, and
estimate a linear probability model. In columns (7) and (8), we take into account the
skewness of the outcome distribution and replace as dependent variable the logarithm
of the conict count (augmented by 0.01). Finally, columns (9) and (10) report
estimates using as dependent variable the cumulative number of conict events in
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the three years prior to the Census. For each model estimation, we add a rst set of
geographical and socio-economic control variables in the second column.19
The estimated coefcients in Table 2 are mostly insignicant at the standard levels.
Cross-sectional estimates do not support the hypothesis that a systematic relationship
exists between within-black ethnic diversity and conict at the district level. This is
consistent with the basic correlation structure discussed in the previous Section.
4.2. First-difference Estimates
As shown in Section 3, the restoration of free internal mobility of blacks induced
meaningful variation over time in the ethnolinguistic composition of districts. We
can thus implement a rst-difference strategy, where we look at the evolution of
both within-black ethnolinguistic diversity and conict over time across districts. We
implement the following regression specication
conf i96 91 D
˛C ˇ Pi96 91 C  Fi96 91 C ı G=N i96 91 CX0i96 91' Cui96 91
(2)
where conf i96 91 is the change in the number of recorded non-state conict
events in district i between year 1991 and 1996, while Pi96 91, Fi96 91 and
G=N i96 91 are the corresponding changes in the within-black ethnic distribution
indexes. The constant term ˛ captures the effect of nationwide events (such as
democratization in 1994) and general time trends. As before, Xit is the vector of
time-varying demographic and economic controls in year t (population, blacks, night-
time light, rural, etc.). The difference residual ui96 91 captures those unobserved
additional factors which affect the change in conict incidence. The proposed rst-
difference specication allows to cancel out both observable and unobservable time-
invariant characteristics at the district level.
Table 3 shows the corresponding set of estimates. We order model specications
as in Table 2. Given that we only have two periods, the rst-difference estimates
from a linear model are equivalent to those obtained from a level specication with
district xed effects. This is not the case for non-linear models, so that in columns
(3) and (4) we report negative binomial xed effects estimates. Also, the district xed
effects now absorb the province xed effects and geographical controls included in the
cross-sectional model. We thus include only time-varying socio-economic controls as
additional regressors in the second column of each model specication.
All estimates consistently support the hypothesis that changes in the within-black
ethnic composition of districts correlate with the evolution of conict. This is again
19. Geographical controls are: ruggedness, slope index, accessibility, agricultural suitability. Socio-
economic controls are: levels of black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs.
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consistent with basic correlation patterns. According to the results in columns (1)
and (2), an increase in one cross-district standard deviation in the within-black
ethnolinguistic polarization measure is associated with more than ve additional
conict events per district: more than four times the 1991 cross-district national
average. The estimated coefcient is signicant at the 5% level.20 Negative binomial
estimates in columns (3) and (4) are also signicant, although only at the 10% level.21
Columns (5) and (6) indicate that one cross-district standard deviation increase in
the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization is associated with an increase of 30
percentage points in the probability of experiencing at least one conict per year.
Estimates are still signicant at the 1% level when the logarithm of conict is used as
outcome in columns (7) and (8), and are signicant at the 5% level when we replace
cumulative conict in a three-year period as dependent variable in columns (9) and
(10).
4.3. Discussion and Robustness
Evidence shows that ethnic distribution measures do not correlate or correlate
weakly with conict in both 1991 and 1996. Nevertheless, the correlation is strongly
signicant when looking at changes over the same period. We interpret these
results as indicating the presence of unobservable characteristics at the district
level that correlate with ethnic distribution and conict incidence in opposite ways,
confounding the cross-sectional estimates. Table A.4 in Appendix A shows how
agricultural suitability can act as such confounder. Another example is ancestral
exposure to contagious diseases, which may be higher in some districts than in others.
Cervellati, Chiovelli, and Esposito (2017) show that ancestral exposure to malaria
increases the benets of interacting in small and geographically separated groups,
thus increasing ethnic diversity. At the same time, disease exposure can increase the
cost of mobilizing individuals for political violence due to poor health of potential
ghters. In this scenario, variation in the disease environment generates a spurious
negative correlation between diversity and conict, biasing downwards the estimated
correlation in levels between the two. The rst-difference specication allows to
net out all time-invariant potential confounders, agricultural suitability and ancestral
exposure to contagious diseases being two of them.
The results in Table 3 also show that the polarization index P is the relevant
ethnic diversity measure in explaining conict incidence during the democratic
transition. This is in line with our argument, as we conceptualize the conict among
black-dominated groups as a ght to achieve political power. Political power is an
20. Table A.5 in Appendix A shows that the signicance of this estimate is not sensitive to the choice
of the time interval over which we track the evolution of conict.
21. Those districts in which no conict events are recorded in both 1991 and 1996 are automatically
dropped from the estimation sample. This reduces the number of observations to 94.
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 21, 2017 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Amodio and Chiovelli Ethnicity and Violence During Democratic Transitions 20
Table 4. Polarization and conict.
Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RQ 5.924*** 5.562*** 5.178*** 5.178* 4.690*** 5.174*** 4.758*** 4.107***
(1.593) (1.628) (1.659) (3.044) (1.669) (1.663) (1.66) (1.409)
 Between-RQ 7.023**
(3.515)
Immigrants
Population 1991 -0.052
(0.506)
RQj 7.692**
(3.332)
Non-state Conf 89-90 -0.273***
(0.026)
R2 0.045 0.058 0.096 0.096 0.108 0.096 0.112 0.354
Main Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports rst-difference coefcient estimates. The unit of
observation is a Magisterial District in South Africa for which information is available in both 1991 and 1996.
The dependent variable is the change in total number of Non-state conict events recorded in the district in the
UCDP-GED v1.5 dataset between 1991 and 1996.RQ is the change in within-black polarization in the same
period.Between-RQ is the change in the polarization between the four races (black, white, asian and colored)
in the district. Immigrants=Population 1991 is the number of blacks immigrating in the district between 1991 and
1996 as a share of the black population in 1991. RQj is the average change in within-black ethnolinguistic
polarization in neighboring districts. Non-state Conf 89-90 is the total number of conict events coded in the
MD in 1989-1990. (1) to (3) and (5) to (8) are rst-difference estimates assuming homoskedastic difference
residuals; in (4) we allow for cross-sectional dependence in the structure of difference residuals (Conley 1999)
allowing for non-zero correlation when coordinate distance between districts’ centroids is less than 1 degree
latitude and/or 1 degree longitude (approximately 110 km). The set of Main Controls includes the change in:
black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs. The set of Additional Controls includes
the change in: rural population, number of individuals with no education, number of individuals unemployed,
number of individuals out of the labor force, number of citizens of South Africa in logs (Sources: UCDP-GED
v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
intrinsically public prize. Results are thus consistent with the theoretical framework in
Esteban and Ray (2011b) showing that the degree of publicness of the disputed prize
determines the salience of polarization P relative to fractionalization F in explaining
conict incidence.
For this reason, in what follows, we restrict our attention to the polarization index.
We implement the same rst-difference regression specication specied above, but
focusing on the binary polarization measureRQ. Table 4 reports coefcient estimates
from this specication. The results in columns (1) and (2) mirror the same columns
of Table 3, showing the salience of the polarization index when computed using
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its binary version RQ. This is not surprising since the variability in RQ overlaps
largely to the variability in P .22 An increase in one cross-district standard deviation
in the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization measure is now associated with almost
two more conicts per district, still more than the 1991 nationwide average. The
corresponding coefcient is signicant at the 1% level. In column (3), we add a
vector of additional time-varying regressors as controls.23 The coefcient of interests
is somewhat smaller in magnitude, but still signicant at the 1% level. In column
(4), we follow Conley (1999) and allow for a non-zero spatial correlation of rst-
difference residuals when coordinate distance between districts’ centroids is less than
1 degree latitude and/or 1 degree longitude (approximately 110 km). The estimate of
our coefcient of interest retains signicance at the 10% level.
One possible concern with these estimates is that a high correlation may exist
between the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and the overall polarization
between main population groups in South Africa, meaning - as dened in the 1991
Census - whites, blacks, asians, and colored. We compute the corresponding value of
between-polarization, and add it as additional regressor in column (5). The coefcient
of within-black polarization decreases in magnitude by around 10%, but remains
signicant at the 1% level. Together with the positive and signicant coefcient of
the between-polarization measure, this indicates that the two measures are indeed
positively correlated, but the within-black polarization carries enough independent
variation to predict the evolution of conict between black organized parties.24
Another concern has to do with the main source of variation over time in the within-
black polarization measure: internal migration. Indeed, the increase (or decrease) in
polarization may just be capturing the inow of migrants in the district. If that was
the case, our estimates would be informative of the salience of divisions between
new immigrants and former residents rather than separation along ethnic lines: a
hypothesis in line with the sons of the soil argument (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin
2011). To address this concern, we add in column (6) an additional regressor equal
to the size of the immigrant population that moved into the district between 1991
and 1996 (as retrievable from the 1996 Census) relative to the district population
22. As Section 3 explained, we identify the black ethnolinguistic groups in South Africa using the
information contained in the Ethnologue linguistic database (Lewis 2009). The groups we identify share
up to 9/11 of their path along the ethnolinguistic tree, so that there is little heterogeneity in terms of
pairwise distances among them.
23. These are the size of the rural population, the number of individuals with no education, the number
of individuals unemployed, the number of individuals not in the labor force, and the number of citizens
of South Africa in logs.
24. In Table C.2 in the Online Appendix, we include a measure of between-polarization that only
captures the polarization between whites and blacks in the population. Results are quantitatively and
qualitatively similar. Table A.6 in Appendix A also shows how the estimated coefcient of the within-
black ethnolinguistic polarization measure remains highly signicant when controlling separately for
the changes of each within-black group’s share. This indicates that none of the latter is individually
responsible for the relationship we nd in the baseline specication.
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size in 1991. When compared to columns (1) to (4), the coefcient of within-black
polarization experiences no change in magnitude, and is still signicant at the 1%
level.25
In column (7), we directly take into account and control for spatial spillovers by
including as regressor the average change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization
in neighboring districts, RQj96 91. The estimated coefcient of within-black
polarization remains signicant at the 1% level.26 Finally, in the last column of Table
4, we augment the rst-difference specication by including as regressor the number
of non-state conict events in 1989 and 1990. Given the general decrease in the
number of conict events over the period, we want to test whether the systematic
relationship we nd between within-black polarization and conict incidence is robust
to conditioning on a measure of pre-1991 conict incidence. The coefcient of the
latter is negative and highly signicant. This means that conict prevalence decreased
more between 1991 and 1996 in those districts with a higher number of conicts in
1989-1990. Nonetheless, the estimated coefcient of within-black polarization is still
signicant at the 1% level.27
Taken altogether, the evidence in Table 4 shows that changes in within-black
ethnolinguistic polarization correlate strongly with the evolution of conict across
districts through the democratization period. In order to further qualify these results,
it is important to understand the extent to which the results may be driven by
omitted variable bias. We follow Oster (2017) and calculate the degree of selection
on unobservables relative to observables which would be necessary to explain away
the result, meaning to produce a coefcient of our variable of interest equal to zero.
These calculations suggest that the unobservables would need to be as important as
the observables to explain away the result.28
25. In Tables C.5 and C.6 in the Online Appendix, we consider two additional variables that capture
the salience of divisions between the new immigrant and the resident population in the district. First,
we divide the size of the immigrant population by the district population size in 1996 rather than 1991.
Second, we compute the polarization index between the immigrant population and former residents in
1996. Including these variables as additional regressors does not change the estimated coefcient of
within-black polarization.
26. Table C.7 in the Online Appendix shows that the coefcient of the within-black ethnolinguistic
polarization is 14% lower and signicant at the 1% level when we include the average change in conict
(the dependent variable) in neighboring districts as regressor, and 21% lower and signicant at the 5%
level when we instrument the latter with the average change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization
in neighboring districts.
27. The Online Appendix provides additional tables showing that results do not change when we use
the estimated number of deaths in non-state conicts per district as the measure of conict incidence and
when we control for a measure of intensity of governmental repression.
28. In Oster (2017), this is captured by the value of the parameter ı , which in our case equals 1:04. The
approach in Oster (2017) differs from the one in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) in that it also factors
movements in the R2 in the calculation. It thus requires to assume a value for the R2 attainable in a
hypothetical regression that includes both observed and unobserved explanatory variables. We refer to
Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) and set this value equal to 0.4. This means that we regard 0.4 as the
maximum value of R2 attainable by a hypothetical model where controls include both observable and
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4.3.1. Agricultural Suitability and Ethnic Inequality. Section 2 explained how,
during democratization, magisterial district institutions were assigned competences
over land titling and redistribution. Black organized parties took widely divergent
positions on this issue. If land issues matter for confrontations among black parties,
and these mobilize individuals for violence along ethnic lines, the relationship
between ethnic diversity and conict will be stronger in districts with higher suitability
for agriculture.
Table 5. Polarization and agricultural suitability.
Total No. of Non-state conict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RQ -6.129** -5.838** -4.919* -4.919
(2.847) (2.863) (2.824) (3.607)
RQ  Suitability 29.944*** 28.853*** 27.558*** 27.558*
(5.953) (6.178) (6.107) (16.181)
R2 0.554 0.563 0.586 0.586
Main Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 586 586
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports xed effects coefcient estimates. The unit of observation
is a Magisterial District in South Africa for which information is available in both 1991 and 1996. The dependent
variable is the total number of Non-state conict events recorded in the district in the UCDP-GED v1.5
dataset in 1991 and 1996. RQ is the within-black polarization in the same year. Suitability is the district-level
measure of agricultural suitability derived from Ramankutty, Foley, Norman, and McSweeney (2002). The set
of Main Controls includes: black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs. The set of
Additional Controls includes: rural population, number of individuals with no education, number of individuals
unemployed, number of individuals out of the labor force, number of citizens of South Africa in logs. (1) to (3) are
rst-difference estimates assuming homoskedastic residuals; those in (4) are rst-difference estimates assuming
heteroskedastic residuals (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
We test this hypothesis by implementing a regression specication with district
xed effects that matches the rst-difference one in equation 2, but including as
additional regressor the interaction between within-black ethnolinguistic polarization
and agricultural suitability (Ramankutty, Foley, Norman, and McSweeney 2002).29
Table 5 shows the corresponding estimation results. The coefcient of the interaction
variable is positive and signicant at least at the 10% level in all specications. This
indicates that those districts where land is more suitable for agriculture drive the
positive relationship between within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and conict.
Evidence supports the hypothesis that incentives to mobilize individuals for political
unobservable variables. This choice is very conservative, as theR2 for our model specication in column
(3) of Table 4 is 0.096.
29. Agricultural suitability per se is time-invariant and therefore its variability absorbed by district xed
effects.
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violence were higher in districts with higher agricultural suitability, and that such
mobilization occurred along ethnic lines.
Table 6. Ethnic inequality and polarization.
Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EI 3.358** 3.061** 3.679*** 3.710*** 3.483***
(1.363) (1.376) (1.382) (1.345) (1.333)
RQ 5.178*** 8.645*** 5.223**
(1.659) (2.141) (2.469)
EI RQ -23.612***
(8.772)
R2 0.021 0.042 0.095 0.096 0.146 0.168
Main Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 283 283 283 294 283 283
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports rst-difference coefcient estimates. The unit of
observation is a Magisterial District in South Africa for which information is available in both 1991 and 1996.
The dependent variable is the change in total number of Non-state conict events recorded in the district in the
UCDP-GED v1.5 dataset between 1991 and 1996.RQ andEI are changes in within-black polarization and
within-black ethnic inequality respectively in the same period. The set of Main Controls includes the change in:
black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs. The set of Additional Controls includes
the change in: rural population, number of individuals with no education, number of individuals unemployed,
number of individuals out of the labor force, number of citizens of South Africa in logs (Sources: UCDP-GED
v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
The relative income of groups may also shape the incentives to mobilize and be
mobilized for political violence. The relationship between ethnic inequality and
conict incidence is a priori ambiguous.30 On the one hand, differences in income
across groups increase the scope for redistribution, raising the incentives to achieve
political power. On the other hand, violence is a less viable option for poor groups
as they have limited access to resources to fund conict. Also, ethnic inequality and
polarization can interact positively or negatively in the generation of conict. While
income differences can make ethnic traits even more salient in polarized societies,
a framing of conict as rich vs. poor can be more powerful when groups are more
unequal in size, and a large poor majority faces a small rich elite.
To shed light on these issues, we rst implement the same rst-difference specication
presented above, but having ethnic inequality as the main regressor. Column (1) of
Table 6 shows that when the change in ethnic inequality is the only included regressor,
its coefcient is positive and signicant at the 5% level. An increase in the ethnic
30. We thank one anonymous referee for pushing us to think in this direction.
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inequality index of one cross-district standard deviation is associated with almost
one more conict event per district. The same is true when we include time-varying
economic controls in columns (2) and (3), with the coefcient of ethnic inequality
becoming signicant at the 1% level. We then move to explore the complementarity or
substitutability between within-black ethnic inequality and polarization in generating
conict. Column (4) of Table 6 replicates column (3) in Table 4, where the main
regressor is the change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization. In column (5),
we include both the ethnic inequality index and the binary polarization index.
The coefcients of both the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and inequality
indexes are positive and highly signicant. Finally, in column (6), we include the
interaction between the two. The corresponding coefcient is negative and highly
signicant. These results suggest that income differences between ethnic groups
matter positively for conict incidence, and more so when group size differences are
larger. For instance, this is the case when a large poor majority faces a small rich
minority, and the scope for redistribution is higher.
4.4. Additional Robustness Checks
First-difference estimates could still reect the presence of unobserved factors which
affect the evolution of both ethnic distribution and conict, generating a spurious
correlation between the two. We address this concern by looking at the evolution
of within-black polarization and conict within clusters of neighboring districts.
Similarly to the neighbors-pair xed-effects analysis in Acemoglu, García-Jimeno,
and Robinson (2012), we assume that districts located next to each other are highly
comparable in terms of both observable and unobservable characteristics. When
looking at the relationship of interest within clusters of neighboring districts, it is
therefore possible to net out those common unobserved sources of heterogeneity
and time-varying omitted variables that may correlate with the evolution of both
polarization and conict incidence. We report the details of the implemented
procedure and results in Table A.7 in Appendix A. We still nd a signicant
relationship between the change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and the
evolution of conict. The corresponding point estimate is comparable to the ones in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, and signicant at the 1% level.
Exploiting differential changes in ethnic composition across neighboring districts can
still be problematic. The relocation choices of internal migrants could possibly be
endogenous to the evolution of conict.31 We address this issue using instrumental
variables. To establish physical separation of blacks and whites, the apartheid regime
forcedly relocated blacks to designated homelands. Forced removals started in the
31. Migration across contiguous districts represents a high fraction of total district-level moves in the
1991-1996. Table C.10 in the Online Appendix shows that, on average, 35% of Xhosa and 28% of Zulu
movers are estimated to relocate in neighboring districts.
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1960s, but continued well into the 1980s. Figure A.6 in Appendix A plots the
distribution of within-black ethnolinguistic polarization across districts in the years
1970, 1991, and 1996. Comparing the 1970 and the 1991 distribution, we can see
how the average level of within-black ethnolinguistic polarization diminishes over
the period. In particular, the mode of the distribution shifts from around 0.7 to less
than 0.2. We interpret this as evidence that, by implementing a model of physical
separation and segregation, the apartheid government successfully enforced an ethnic
distribution characterized by a lower number of polarized districts and a higher
number of homogenous ones. Between 1991 and 1996, the distribution appears to
move in the opposite direction, back to its shape in 1970. This indicates that the
internal migration ows that followed the repeal of apartheid legislation partially
overturned the spatial ethnic-based architecture of the regime.
We can exploit this nding to construct an instrumental variable. We use the
difference between within-black ethnolinguistic polarization in 1970 and its value
in 1991 to predict the difference between 1996 and 1991. That is, we use
eRQi D RQi;1970  RQi;1991 as instrument for RQi D RQi;1996  RQi;1991.
Identication requires that the instrument induces meaningful variation in the
observed change in polarization, and is independent from the change in conict
incidence in 1991-1996. The rst condition is satised as long as historical return
migration at least partially informs the patterns of internal migration in the period.
The extent to which the second condition is satised depends instead on the extent to
which the ethnic distribution in 1970 is independent from the struggle between black
organized parties in the 1990s.
Table A.8 in Appendix A shows OLS estimates in Panel A, and both rst and second
stage IV estimates in Panel B. The need of retrieving ethnolinguistic information
consistently from 1970 to 1996 forces us to reduce the sample size to 270 magisterial
districts. The OLS estimates in Panel A are comparable with those reported in Table
4, and signicant at the 1% level across all specications. First stage estimates in
Panel B show that our instrument correlates with the actual change in within-black
ethnolinguistic polarization. However, the F-statistics for the signicance test of the
instrument in the rst stage regression is only close to the threshold value of 10. The
strength of our instrument is therefore borderline, so we interpret these estimates with
some caution. The specications in columns (1) to (3) mirror the ones in the same
columns of Table 4, where we progressively include our sets of main and additional
time-varying controls. The second stage estimate of our coefcient of interest is
signicant at the 10% level, and almost three times bigger than its corresponding
OLS estimate. This suggests that endogenous migration decisions may be responsible
for a downward bias in previous estimates. However, results from a Hausman test
do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of both the OLS and IV estimators being
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consistent (Hausman 1978).32 One possible concern with our instrumental variable
strategy is that historical return migration itself can be among the determinants of
the struggle among black organized parties at the local level, violating the exclusion
restriction. To address this issue - and mirroring column (6) of Table 4 - we include as
additional regressor the size of the immigrant population which moved in the district
between 1991 and 1996 relative to the district population size in 1991. Column (4)
of Table A.8 in Appendix A shows that the coefcient of within-black polarization
experiences little change in magnitude and remains signicant at the 10% level.33
Overall, the results in this Section conrm the existence of a positive relationship
between the change in within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and the evolution of
conict during democratization.
4.5. Additional Supporting Evidence
Our main argument is that during democratization ethnicity stands out as a salient
technology to separate individuals into well-identied groups and mobilize them
for political violence. Embedded in this reasoning is the claim that the relationship
between ethnolinguistic polarization and conict incidence occurs through political
mobilization. If data on the political afliation of each individual were available for
both 1991 and 1996, we could study how within-black ethnolinguistic diversity maps
into political diversity and thus conict incidence in both periods in a systematic
way. Unfortunately, no data on political afliation are available at the magisterial
district level for those years. We can nonetheless provide at least suggestive evidence
of this link by looking at the results from the rst democratic elections in 1994. We
can use disaggregated information on election results at the district level to compute
an index of within-black political polarization, and investigate whether a meaningful
32. One possible source of difference between OLS and IV estimates is measurement error. Focusing
on the results in column (1) of Table A.8, a simple calculation based on the formula for the attenuation
bias indicates that, if random measurement error was solely responsible for the difference we observe in
coefcient estimates, it would account for 65% of the variability in the observed change of within-black
polarization. A different explanation is in the possible endogeneity of internal migration moves to the
evolution of conict. If internal migrants avoided relocating in districts where they expected conict to
increase, the OLS estimate would be downward bias to the extent to which these relocation choices made
the increase in ethnolinguistic polarization lower than what it would have been otherwise. Finally, the
difference between the OLS and IV coefcient estimates can also reect the local interpretation of the
instrumental variable estimate of the parameter we wish to identify (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996).
33. Table C.11 in the Online Appendix shows that results do not change when we replace as controls
the other two proxies for the salience of internal migration that we use in Tables C.5 and C.6. Another
concern with the proposed strategy is that the value of within-black ethnolinguistic polarization in 1991
appears negatively both in our instrument and the endogenous regressor, possibly accounting for all the
predictive power of our instrument. To address this concern, we implement a falsication test where we use
polarization in 1991 as instrument for the change between 1991 and 1996. The corresponding estimates
in Table A.9 in Appendix A are very different from the ones in Table A.8, ruling out the possibility that
the variability in 1991 polarization is by itself driving our results.
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relationship exists between the latter and within-black ethnolinguistic polarization in
1991.34
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Figure 3. Ethnolinguistic and political polarization. The gure plots the average level of political
polarization among black-dominated political parties in the 1994 general elections. For each
province, the average level of political polarization is shown separately for those districts in the top
and bottom quartile of the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization distribution. Both polarization
measures are computed using the binary version of the polarization measure as explained in Section
3. The political parties considered in the computation of the political polarization index are: ANC,
IFP, PAC, ACDP (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991; Alvarez-Rivera 2004).
Figure 3 plots the average level of within-black political polarization across districts
separately for each province, and further split according to the level of within-
black ethnolinguistic polarization. In particular, the gure shows the average level
of political polarization in the top and the bottom quartile of the ethnolinguistic
polarization distribution within each province. There is meaningful variation in the
level of political polarization across provinces. Not surprisingly, the province with
the highest level of within-black political polarization is the KwaZulu-Natal: the IFP
stronghold. Despite this, a clear pattern emerges within provinces in the relationship
between political polarization and ethnolinguistic diversity. With the exception of
the Gauteng province, those districts with the highest within-black ethnolinguistic
polarization in 1991 show higher levels of within-black political polarization in 1994.
This relationship is signicant. The estimated coefcient of the RQ index in 1991
from a regression of within-black political polarization in 1994 on the former and
province xed effects is equal to 0.10 and signicant at the 6% level. The result
for the Gauteng province reects a rural/urban divide: Johannesburg and Pretoria,
34. As Section 3 explains, in the computation of the within-black political polarization index at the
electoral district level we consider the ANC, IFP, PAC and ACDP parties, and use the binary version of
the polarization indexRQ.
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two of the biggest urban clusters in the country, are both located in Gauteng, and
ethnic lines are less salient in the political struggle within the young urban black
population.35 We interpret this evidence as suggestive of the existence of a mapping
between ethnolinguistic and political polarization.
Table 7. Ethnic distribution and conict in democratic South Africa.
Change in Total No. of Conict Events 2001-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RQ -0.359 -0.300 -0.324 -0.324
(0.341) (0.395) (0.406) (0.271)
R2 0.005 0.020 0.043 0.043
Main Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 231 231 231 231
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports rst-difference coefcient estimates. The unit of
observation is a Local Municipality in South Africa for which information is available in both 2001 and 2011.
The dependent variable is the change in total number of conict events coded in the ACLED dataset in the same
period.RQ is the corresponding change in the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization measure. The set of
Main Controls includes the change in: black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs.
The set of Additional Controls includes the change in: rural population, number of individuals with no education,
number of individuals unemployed, number of individuals out of the labor force, number of citizens of South
Africa in logs. (1), (2), (3) are rst-difference estimates assuming homoskedastic difference residuals; those in
(4) are rst-difference estimates assuming heteroskedastic difference residuals (Sources: Raleigh, Linke, Hegre,
and Karlsen 2010; Statistics South Africa 2004, 2014; NOOA 2012).
The narratives presented in Section 2 also make clear that incentives to achieve
political power were highest during democratization, also at the local level. The
period of democratization was crucial to establish the rules of the game as politicians
designed and implemented policies that were expected to shape the future of the
country. We therefore expect the incentives to mobilize individuals for political
violence to peak during this period, and to decrease thereafter. We test this hypothesis
using Census and conict data from the years 2001 and 2011.36 Table 7 reports
the corresponding coefcient estimates. Consistent with Table 4, we focus on the
binary version of the polarization index.37 Evidence shows no systematic relationship
between within-black ethnolinguistic polarization and conict incidence in 2001
through 2011. This indicates that the salience of ethnicity in the violent political
35. The qualitative evidence in Section 2 also highlights the salience of the confrontations between the
multi-ethnic ANC and the Zulu-based IFP. When we regress the same measure of within-black political
polarization in 1994 over an RQ index that only considers Zulus and non-Zulus, the coefcient of the
latter is equal to -0.04 and insignicant. This suggests that the measure that is relevant to our results is
the one that consider all seven black groups.
36. As Section 3 explained, in this part of the analysis we adopt the local municipality as unit of analysis
and use ACLED data to derive our measure of local conict incidence.
37. Table C.12 in the Online Appendix shows the results from a specication where the three within-
black distribution indexes are included, in accordance with Tables 2 and 3.
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struggle diminished after democratization, and that current political tensions in South
Africa do not manifest themselves through ethnic markers. This corroborates our view
that the incentives to mobilize individuals for political violence were stronger during
the process of democratization than in the period thereafter, when the institutions and
main policies of democratic South Africa are already established.
5. Conclusions
This paper exploits the features of history of contemporary South Africa to study the
relationship between ethnic diversity and political violence during democratization.
The implementation and repeal of apartheid segregation laws induced meaningful
changes in the ethnic composition of districts. At the same time, black-dominated
political groups struggled violently among themselves to achieve power and dominate
the new institutional scenario. Our analysis shows that the evolution of conict
correlates signicantly with the changes in ethnic composition that occurred in the
democratization period. Results are robust to the inclusion of an array of controls,
and are not confounded by unobserved factors at a ne geographical level. An
instrumental variable strategy that exploits and predicts historical return migration
also conrms the presence of a strong positive relationship between within-black
ethnolinguistic polarization and the incidence of armed confrontations between black-
dominated groups.
We interpret the evidence in this paper as showing that, during democratization,
ethnic markers stand out as a readily available technology to separate individuals into
well-identied groups, and mobilize them for political violence. Does this affect the
quality of democracy and its consolidation? In their study of Kenya, Burgess, Jedwab,
Miguel, Morjaria, and Padró i Miquel (2015) show that ethnic favoritism disappears
during periods of democracy. Is this still the case when the transition is violent and the
battle for power is fought along ethnic lines? We plan to investigate these questions
in our future research.
Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A.1. One-sided and non-state conict events: 1989–1998.
Gov. Repression Non-state Conicts
Year Conict Events Est. Deaths Conict Events Est. Deaths
1989 34 54 185 226
1990 147 195 399 1243
1991 48 49 385 657
1992 61 61 479 665
1993 73 67 415 643
1994 16 14 230 444
1995 0 0 39 143
1996 0 0 37 156
1997 0 0 20 30
1998 0 0 23 44
1999 0 0 11 19
2000 0 0 1 0
2002 3 2 0 0
2004 0 0 4 0
2010 1 1 0 0
Notes: The table shows the total number of One-sided and Non-state conict events per year in South Africa
recorded in the geo-referenced Event Dataset of the Uppsala Conict Data Program - UCDP-GED v1.5 which
can be mapped into Magisterial Districts, together with the estimated total number of deaths.
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Table A.2. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Panel A: Year 1991
Non-state conict Events 1.271 5.192 0 41 303
P 0.226 0.209 0 0.623 296
F 0.240 0.244 0 0.800 296
G=N 0.588 0.617 0 3.856 296
RQ 0.368 0.336 0 0.989 296
EI 0.501 0.194 0 0.819 285
Blacks 72.418 110.795 0 972.838 299
Population 103.67 156.61 3.04 1546.067 299
Rural Population 44.876 76.325 0 419.321 299
No Education 29.879 37.919 1.136 253.145 299
Unemployed 7.194 15.502 0.034 189.362 299
Night-time Lights 4.133 12.79 0 63 354
Accessibility 2.04 0.762 1 4 351
Ruggedness 2.249 1.448 0.237 6.538 354
Slope Index 73.009 22.623 13 99 351
Agricultural Suitability 0.451 0.256 0.008 0.927 353
Panel B: Year 1996
Non-state conict Events 0.105 0.692 0 6 354
P 0.210 0.207 0 0.628 350
F 0.218 0.236 0 0.797 350
G=N 0.527 0.571 0 2.337 350
RQ 0.34 0.332 0 0.997 350
EI 0.358 0.203 0 0.787 345
Blacks 87.97 109.609 0 896.042 354
Population 114.63 139.528 3.557 902.861 354
Rural Population 53.123 73.148 0 404.352 354
No Education 21.674 23.123 0.929 137.231 354
Unemployed 13.403 20.166 0.214 189.748 354
Night-time Lights 4.816 13.26 0 63 354
Panel C: Difference 1991-1996
Non-state conict Events -1.044 4.9 -41 6 298
P 0.003 0.107 -0.560 0.628 294
F -0.004 0.111 -0.666 0.539 294
G=N -0.010 0.411 -3.856 2.337 294
RQ 0.002 0.177 -0.889 0.997 294
EI -0.155 0.217 -0.775 0.589 283
Blacks 3.541 69.902 -665.71 338.236 298
Population 2.752 78.429 -788.692 347.736 298
Rural Population -2.697 40.793 -224.642 175.135 298
No Education -10.822 23.11 -195.972 52.845 298
Unemployed 4.695 12.893 -118.249 78.861 298
Night-time Lights 0.785 3.15 -15 29 298
Notes: Data for Blacks, Population, Rural Population, No Education, Unemployed, Not Economically Active
and Citizens of South Africa are in thousands. All variables are discussed in Section 3 and Appendix B (Sources:
UCDP-GED v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; Nunn and Puga 2012; IIASA/FAO 2012; NOOA 2012;
Ramankutty, Foley, Norman, and McSweeney 2002).
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Table A.2. Summary statistics (continued).
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Panel D: Year 1970
RQ 0.430 0.318 0 0.989 270
Panel E: Year 2001
ACLED Conict Events 0.263 1.502 0 16 232
P 0.210 0.191 0 0.617 231
F 0.214 0.217 0 0.785 231
G=N 0.490 0.509 0 2.600 231
RQ 0.343 0.307 0 0.980 231
Blacks 151.378 277.870 0.145 2362.160 232
Population 191.242 408.135 6.152 3221.259 232
Rural Population 83.446 99.124 0.364 552.296 232
No Education 46.241 70.787 1.625 566.975 232
Unemployed 35.750 85.270 0.862 725.955 232
Night-time Lights 3.068 6.367 0.009 52.782 232
Panel F: Year 2011
ACLED Conict Events 0.368 1.763 0 21 234
P 0.248 0.180 0.021 0.612322 234
F 0.260 0.222 0.019 0.7872139 234
G=N 0.628 0.624 0.041 3.405 234
RQ 0.403 0.290 0.037 0.979 234
Blacks 175.218 370.333 0.198 3388.92 234
Population 221.242 521.223 7.018 4434.922 234
Rural Population 82.141 104.292 0.123 528.938 234
No Education 7.031 13.049 0.292 99.981 234
Unemployed 37.604 92.734 1.117 776.606 234
Night-time Lights 3.626 6.790 0.011 55.668 234
Panel G: Difference 2001-2011
ACLED Conict Events 0.108 0.774 -4 5 232
P 0.036 0.093 -0.349 0.527 231
F 0.043 0.116 -0.280 0.714 231
G=N 0.125 0.435 -0.548 3.405 231
RQ 0.057 0.150 -0.551 0.842 231
Blacks 25.010 105.964 -183.029 1026.761 232
Population 31.322 128.022 -182.0745 1213.663 232
Rural Population -0.795 28.910 -187.639 176.196 232
No Education -39.168 58.155 -477.167 5.976 232
Unemployed 2.094 15.028 -26.916 154.716 232
Night-time Lights 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.005 232
Notes. Data for Blacks, Population, Rural Population, No Education, Unemployed, Not Economically Active
and Citizens of South Africa are in thousands. All variables are discussed in Section 3 and Appendix B (Sources:
Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen 2010; Statistics South Africa 2011, 2004, 2014; NOOA 2012;Ramankutty,
Foley, Norman, and McSweeney 2002).
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Table A.3. Group population sizes.
Total Population Difference 1996-1991
1991 Census 1996 Census Overall Study Sample
298 MDs 354 MDs 294 MDs
Xhosa 2,493,382 7,206,005 4,712,623 77,370
Zulu 8,416,125 9,216,413 800,288 163,555
Sotho 6,414,684 7,378,473 963,789 234,038
Swazi 943,989 1,017,233 73,244 45,365
Tswana 1,437,660 3,299,902 1,862,242 463,044
Tsonga 1,450,874 1,757,589 306,715 82,791
Venda 116,533 876,546 760,013 2,296
Black 21,642,766 31,141,365 9,498,599 1,054,760
White 5,069,377 4,426,117 -643,260 -666,198
Asian 985,363 1,045,168 59,805 52,964
Colored 3,277,020 3,593,966 316,946 54,280
Notes: The table reports the ethnic group population sizes in South Africa in 1991 and 1996, together with
overall difference and the difference computed over those districts for which information is available in both the
1991 and 1996 Census (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
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Table A.4. Correlations of main variables and controls.
Panel A: Year 1991
P F EI Conict Blacks Population Lights
F 0.9529
(0.0000)
EI -0.2810 -0.3700
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Conict -0.0015 0.0336 0.0296
(0.9799) (0.5655) (0.6191)
Blacks 0.1460 0.1983 -0.1501 0.1608
(0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0113) (0.0057)
Population 0.0960 0.1796 -0.1662 0.1723 0.7929
(0.1004) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0000)
Night-time Lights 0.2104 0.3155 -0.1945 0.1471 0.2854 0.4739
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0115) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Suitability -0.2344 -0.1846 0.0833 0.2438 0.3624 0.3116 0.1199
(0.0001) (0.0015) (0.1623) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0402)
Panel B: Year 1996
P F EI Conict Blacks Population Lights
F 0.9396
(0.0000)
EI -0.2719 -0.3612
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Conict -0.0465 0.0052 -0.0468
(0.4273) (0.9287) (0.4279)
Blacks 0.0478 0.1517 0.1233 0.0601
(0.4147) (0.0092) (0.0361) (0.3040)
Population 0.0449 0.1732 -0.0353 0.0797 0.7793
(0.4432) (0.0029) (0.5497) (0.1730) (0.0000)
Night-time Lights 0.1643 0.2819 -0.1953 0.0084 0.3977 0.5448
(0.0047) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.8856) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Suitability -0.2857 -0.2192 0.1463 0.0739 0.3989 0.3653 0.1646
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0129) (0.2070) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0047)
Panel C: Difference 1991-1996
 P  F EI  Conict  Blacks  Population
 F 0.9441
(0.0000)
 EI -0.0376 -0.0238
(0.5290) (0.6897)
 Conict 0.1860 0.1512 0.1454
(0.0014) (0.0094) (0.0144)
 Blacks -0.1723 -0.1969 -0.0729 -0.0895
(0.0030) (0.0007) (0.2212) (0.1259)
 Population -0.1761 -0.1940 0.0055 -0.0754 0.6883
(0.0024) (0.0008) (0.9270) (0.1974) (0.0000)
 Night-time Lights -0.0355 -0.0379 -0.0199 -0.1091 0.0278 0.0327
(0.5447) (0.5178) (0.7383) (0.0618) (0.6353) (0.5761)
Notes: The Table shows the estimated correlation between the main variables of interest and main controls in
levels in 1991 and 1996 and in differences 1991-1996, with p-values in parenthesis (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5;
Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
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Table A.6. Within-black group shares as controls.
Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RQ 6.499*** 4.961*** 5.403*** 5.362*** 5.174*** 5.215*** 5.234*** 6.282***
(1.685) (1.635) (1.778) (1.679) (1.662) (1.680) (1.663) (1.748)
 Sh. XhosaWB 10.865***
(3.402)
 Sh. ZuluWB -13.569*** -43.828***
(4.314) (7.074)
 Sh. SothoWB -1.503 -10.817**
(4.223) (4.354)
 Sh. SwaziWB -7.346 -52.918***
(9.799) (12.440)
 Sh. TswanaWB -1.648 -2.448
(4.642) (4.477)
 Sh. TsongaWB 1.114 -35.492***
(7.385) (10.264)
 Sh. VendaWB 32.563 20.663
(46.678) (48.925)
R2 0.127 0.126 0.096 0.098 0.096 0.096 0.097 0.209
Main Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Heteroskedastic difference residuals are assumed in all columns. The
table reports rst-difference coefcient estimates. The unit of observation is a Magisterial District in South
Africa for which information is available in both 1991 and 1996. The dependent variable is the change in total
number of Non-state conict events recorded in the district in the UCDP-GED v1.5 dataset between 1991 and
1996. RQ is the change in within-black polarization in the same period. For each black ethnolinguistic
group, Sh. GroupWB is the change in the within-black share of that group. The set of Main Controls
includes the change in: black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs. The set of
Additional Controls includes the change in: rural population, number of individuals with no education, number
of individuals unemployed, number of individuals out of the labor force, number of citizens of South Africa in
logs (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
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Table A.7. First-difference with cluster-specic trends.
Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events
(1) (2) (3)
RQ 6.08*** 6.36*** 5.26***
(1.831) (1.982) (1.514)
Main Controls No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No Yes Yes
Polynomial of Controls No No Yes
Observations 227 227 227
Repetitions 200 200 200
Notes: Empirical standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports coefcients estimates and standard errors
from a rst-difference specication with cluster-specic trends. We obtain coefcient estimates and standard
errors as follows. We dene as treated those districts g 2M where our polarization measure decreased more
than average in 1991-1996. We then keep their neighboring non-treated districts f 2 N.g/, and drop treated
districts with non-treated neighboring districts. We obtain a sub-sample of 227 out of the initial 294 districts,
with the nal subsample containing 105 treated and 122 non-treated districts. For each treated district g 2M
and its non-treated neighbors f 2 N.g/, we implement the following regression specication:
confg96 91 D ı C g C ˇ RQg96 91CX0g96 91'C"g96 91 g 2M
conff 96 91 D ı C g C ˇ RQf 96 91CX0f 96 91'C"f 96 91 f 2 N.g/
(A.1)
where conf i96 91 is the change in the number of recorded non-state conict events in district i between
year 1991 and 1996,RQi96 91 is the change in the within-blacks polarization index (with i D g;f ). Time
trends are controlled for by ı , and g captures cluster-specic trends, controlling for unobservable determinants
of evolution of conict in 1991-1996, possibly related with change in polarization over the period. In other words,
we include a dummy for each cluster of districts, taking value one for all treated and non-treated observation
in the cluster. Xit is the vector of time-variant district characteristics in year t (population, blacks, night-
time light, rural, etc.). The difference residual"i96 91 captures those idiosyncratic unobserved changes and
factors which affect the change in conict incidence, net of cluster-specic trends. A bootstrap-type procedure
is implemented, where at each repetition every control district is randomly matched to a single treated district
and coefcients from the rst-difference specication with cluster-specic trends are estimated. The set of Main
Controls includes the change in: black population, total population, night-time satellite light value in logs. The
set of Additional Controls includes the change in: rural population, number of individuals with no education,
number of individuals unemployed, number of individuals out of the labor force, number of citizens of South
Africa in logs. Specication (3) is augmented with a 3rd order Polynomial of all Controls (Sources: UCDP-GED
v1.5; Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
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Table A.8. Instrumental variable estimation.
Panel A. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RQ 6.830*** 6.544*** 6.226*** 6.258***
(1.805) (1.867) (1.891) (1.900)
Immigrants
Population 1991 -0.177
(0.771)
R2 0.051 0.065 0.104 0.104
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimates
First Stage: Change in Polarization Measure RQ
fRQ 0.168*** 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.158***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
F-stat 9.72 9.14 9.44 8.21
Second Stage: Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events
cRQ 19.882* 20.320* 19.166* 21.043*
(10.510) (11.123) (10.768) (11.788)
Immigrants
Population 1991 -0.623
(0.909)
Main Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 270 270 270 270
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports Ordinary Least Squares (Panel A) and Instrumental
Variable (Panel B) rst-difference coefcient estimates. The unit of observation is a Magisterial District in South
Africa for which information is available in 1970, 1991 and 1996. The dependent variable is the change in total
number of Non-state conict events recorded in the district in the UCDP-GED v1.5 dataset between 1991 and
1996.RQ is the change in within-black polarization in the same period.fRQ is the instrumental variable:
the difference between the 1970 and the 1991 polarization,RQ1970 RQ1991. Immigrants=Population 1991
is the number of blacks immigrating in the district between 1991 and 1996 as a share of the black population in
1991. The set of Main Controls includes the change in: black population, total population, night-time satellite
light value in logs. The set of Additional Controls includes the change in: rural population, number of individuals
with no education, number of individuals unemployed, number of individuals out of the labor force, number of
citizens of South Africa in logs (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5, Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
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Table A.9. Instrumental variable falsication instrument: within-black polarization in 1991.
First Stage: Change in Polarization Measure RQ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RQ1991 -0.139*** -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.138***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
F-stat 21.95 23.95 22.04 21.45
Second Stage: Change in Total No. of Non-state conict Events
cRQ 3.734 4.046 5.263 5.337
(6.573) (6.445) (6.642) (6.731)
Immigrants
Population 1991 -0.149
(0.780)
Main Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 270 270 270 270
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The table reports Instrumental Variable rst-difference coefcient
estimates. The unit of observation is a Magisterial District in South Africa for which information is available
in 1970, 1991 and 1996. The dependent variable is the change in total number of Non-state conict events
recorded in the district in the UCDP-GED v1.5 dataset between 1991 and 1996. RQ is the change in
within-black polarization in the same period. RQ1991 is the 1991 polarization, which we use as instrument.
Immigrants=Population 1991 is the number of blacks immigrating in the district between 1991 and 1996 as a
share of the black population in 1991. The set of Main Controls includes the change in: black population, total
population, night-time satellite light value in logs. The set of Additional Controls includes the change in: rural
population, number of individuals with no education, number of individuals unemployed, number of individuals
out of the labor force, number of citizens of South Africa in logs (Sources: UCDP-GED v1.5, Statistics South
Africa 1991, 1998; NOOA 2012).
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Figure A.1. . Map of Bantustans in South Africa as of 1986, produced by the U.S. CIA (Source:
University of Texas at Austin 1986).
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MDs in both 1991 and 1996 Samples
MDs in 1996 Sample Only
Map of Magisterial Districts in South Africa
Figure A.2. Map of magisterial districts in South Africa . Districts in dark grey are those for which
we can recover information from both the 1991 and 1996 Census, and thus belong to the study
sample. Those Bantustans which were already granted independence are not covered by the 1991
Census of the Republic of South Africa (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
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Figure A.3. Ethnic group populations per district: changes 1991–1996. . The gure shows the
changes in the population share of each ethnolinguistic group in each Magisterial District plotted
over the initial share of blacks. Observations are those districts for which information is available
in both 1991 and 1996. This excludes districts in the apartheid homelands which were granted
independence and were no longer part of the Republic of South Africa. Observations are averaged
per bins of share of blacks of size 2.5% (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
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Figure A.4. Ethnic group populations per district: changes 1991-1996. . The top graphs in the
gure show the change in population share of each of the three biggest black ethnolinguistic groups
in each Magisterial District plotted over the initial share of each group. The bottom graphs plot
instead the changes for the two biggest groups, Xhosa and Zulu, over the population share of the
other in 1991. Observations are those districts for which information is available in both 1991 and
1996. This excludes districts in the apartheid homelands which were granted independence and
were no longer part of the Republic of South Africa. Observations are averaged per bins of share
of blacks of size 2.5%. Taking these gures and Figure A.3 together, we can notice the following
patterns. Districts where the population share of Zulu grew the most between 1991 and 1996 are
those were both the Zulu population share and the share of blacks in 1991 were large but not close
to one. According to the bottom graphs, the Xhosa population share was very low in 1991 in these
same districts. The Zulu group population seems thus to have increased more than proportionally
in those districts with a relevant presence of non-black population, and where the Zulu themselves
were already a large share of the population. Similarly, looking at changes in the Xhosa population
shares, these seem to be disproportionally more positive in those districts where the Zulu group
population share was low in 1991, and more negative otherwise. Again, the most important changes
in absolute terms seem to be observed where non-black population shares were positive in 1991
(Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 21, 2017 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Amodio and Chiovelli Ethnicity and Violence During Democratic Transitions 44
.5
1
1.
5
2
De
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6
Within-black Ethnolinguistic Polarization (P)
1991 1996
.5
1
1.
5
2
De
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Within-black Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (F)
1991 1996
Figure A.5. Ethnic distribution across districts. The gures plot the distributions of the within-
black ethnolinguistic polarization P and fractionalization F across districts in South Africa in the
years 1991 and 1996. Districts are weighted according to their population of blacks. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distribution does not reject the null hypothesis of equality between the
two distributions. Nonetheless, we nd evidence of substantial within-variation, as shown in Figure
1 (Sources: Statistics South Africa 1991, 1998).
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Figure A.6. Ethnic polarization across districts: 1970–1996. The gure plots the distribution of
the within-black ethnolinguistic polarization index RQ across districts in South Africa in the years
1970, 1991, and 1996. Districts are weighted according to their population of blacks. The gure
shows how the apartheid legislation and initiatives lead to a shift in the distribution, with an increase
in the density of less polarized districts. The distribution moves back towards its 1970 shape in 1996
(Sources: Statistics South Africa 2011, 1991, 1998).
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Appendix B: Data Appendix
This Section provides additional information on the data sources and variables that
we use in the empirical analysis.
Census Data - We use data from the South African Census of 1970, 1991, 1996, 2001,
and 2011 to derive information on the population size of African native groups and
races in each magisterial district (Statistics South Africa 2011, 1991, 1998, 2004,
2014). We then use this information to compute the value of ethnic distribution
measures (see Section 3 for further details). We use the same data to also identify
respondents belonging to the top 10% of the overall black income distribution,
and compute the value of the ethnic inequality index. We also derive a number of
additional socio-economic variables: total population, rural population, number of
individuals reporting no education, number of unemployed individuals, number of
individuals out of the labor force, and number of South African citizens. In the
derivation of all these variables we collapse individual-level data at the district level
using population weights.
Night-time Lights - We follow Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014), and use
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOOA 2012) night-time light
satellite images data for 1992 (the rst available year), 1996, 2001 and 2011 to derive
a proxy for economic conditions in South Africa at the local level. Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2014, 2013) provide an extensive discussion of these data and the
validity of using night-time light as proxy for economic conditions in the African
territories. See also Doll, Muller, and Morley (2006) and Sutton, Elvidge, and Ghosh
(2007). We average night-time light density within each district across 30 arc-second
grid areas (approximately 1 square kilometer at the equator). In our regression
specications, we augment the night-time light satellite measure by 0.01 before taking
its logarithm. Results are unaltered with respect to other or no level shift.
Terrain Ruggedness - We take this measure from Nunn and Puga (2012). Data are
available at http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/. As for night-time lights, we average
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the ruggedness measure across 30 arc-second grid areas (approximately 1 square
kilometer at the equator) within each district.
Terrain Slope Index - We use the measure from the Global Aero-ecological Zones
(GAEZ) project (IIASA/FAO 2012). This is available at the 5 arc-minute by 5 arc-
minute (approximately 9 km by 9 km at the equator) grid-cell level. We average its
values across grid cells within each district.
Accessibility Index - We use the measure from the Global Aero-ecological Zones
(GAEZ) project (IIASA/FAO 2012). This is computed as the estimated travel time to
the nearest city with 50,000 or more inhabitants in year 2000. The measure is available
at the 5 arc-minute by 5 arc-minute (approximately 9 km by 9 km at the equator) grid-
cell level. We average its values across grid cells within each district.
Agricultural Suitability - We take this measure from Ramankutty, Foley, Norman,
and McSweeney (2002). The measure is available at the 0.5 by 0.5 decimal degrees
(approximately 55 km by 55 km at the equator) grid-cell level. It takes values between
0 and 1, and indicates for each the probability that a particular grid cell may be
cultivated. We average its value across cells within magisterial districts to derive a
district-level measure of agricultural suitability. See also Michalopoulos (2012) for a
detailed explanation of this measure.
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